1 commentupdate:Feb 5, 2007
Conflicts between veterinary and public health agencies emerge over HPAI.
Guest Bloggers
The New Delhi meeting was arranged for representatives
of eleven Asian nations to review the control and prevention of HPAI and
hopefully resolve some conflicts. By Simon
Shane
On Thursday 27th July a conference was arranged for
representatives of eleven Asian nations to review the control and prevention of
HPAI.
The objective of the event, which was organized jointly by the
FAO and the
WHO, was to
coordinate activities of veterinary regulators and public health officials with
regard to their relative responsibilities in the face of extensive and
widespread outbreaks in poultry and the ongoing sporadic, extremely infrequent,
low-level direct transmission to susceptible human contacts of infected domestic
ducks and chickens.
From the outset of the AI panornitic in SE Asia
in 2004 there has been a lack of coordination and understanding of the
epidemiology of H5N1 infection among and between veterinarians and physicians.
Conflicts have arisen within some countries as to the relevant responsibility
and authority to suppress infection. The New Delhi meeting was intended to
resolve some of the issues and to encourage the nations with incident cases to
apply established principles of control, as modified by the lessons of the past
three years.
Firstly it must be recognized that H5N1 infection is a
disease of poultry. This presumes that qualified veterinary epidemiologists,
well versed in the control of catastrophic diseases of avian species will
represent the first line of defense. The simplistic doctrine of eradication of
H5N1 infection by "stamping out" is inappropriate to the subsistence poultry
populations of Vietnam, Thailand, China, Indonesia and India. The presence of
large commercial production units in these countries with a high concentration
of susceptible chickens is a further complication which negates the feasibility
of complete and rapid eradication. Competent veterinary authorities would and
should have adopted pre-emptive vaccination at the outset of the infection
rather than attempting the expedient of protracted slaughter campaigns after the
introduction of the virus into poultry populations. This approach has resulted
in infection becoming endemic in subsistence poultry representing a danger to
rural residents.
The dire prediction of the "inevitable" mutation of
the H5N1 virus to become infectious to humans has not materialized and is
unlikely to occur based on recent knowledge of the molecular biology of the
virus. The threat of a human influenza pandemic does however justify developing
appropriate contingency plans including early detection through surveillance,
stockpiling antiviral medication and resources for treatment and accelerating
production of vaccines for humans. These activities are the rightful
responsibility of the WHO and the national agencies dealing with public health.
The best defense against human influenza of avian origin is
to reduce the quantum of H5N1 virus in the poultry population. This can be
achieved under the direction of trained, empowered veterinarians applying a
coordinated program of detection through surveillance, pre-emptive vaccination,
culling with fair compensation and strict quarantine of affected farms and
limiting movement of live birds and products.
By: Simon
Shane
More
news on bird flu
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